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The Concept of Neo-Populism
Although most of these neo-populist electoral successes have been met with concern by the traditional media, particularly because of the anti-immigrant message that characterizes most of these parties, the nature of their appeal is more complex. Some have defied the "right-wing" label; others have attracted former leftists or urban dwellers; and each contains certain elements of the different strands of populism. Populisms term that is used in both social science and the public arena to denote a form of antiestablishment political activity. Studies of populism have sought to avoid the normative discussion of populism and instead develop it as a concept. Mudde (2000) notes that much of the debate among scholars is whether Theresa all-encompassing form of populism or whether there are different types of populism. He argues for the latter approach, and describes three different types of populism: 1) agrarian populism; 2) economic populism; and 3) political populism. We suggest that the recent electoral successes of populist parties in Western can be attributed to their ability to combine elements of all three types, and that most of these parties do not fit conveniently into a left-right political spectrum -hence the use of the term "neopopulist."
Previous Research on Neo-Populist Parties
Several scholars believe that the political divisions of European countries have changed recently, and that this shift has contributed to the rise of neo-populist parties in Europe (Hout et al. 1996) . Western European democracies have been characterized by two major cleavage dimensions: 1) the economic cleavage dimension, which pits workers against the owners, and also concerns the degree of state involvement in the economy, and 2) the socio-cultural cleavage dimension, which is about issues such as immigration, law and order, abortion, etc. (Rydgren, 2010 ) Rydgren believes that populist parties have become increasingly popular as economic divisions have become less salient, alienating many working class voters from their traditional parties such as the Social Democrats. Rydgren (2010) analyzed why neo-populist parties have been highly successful in Denmark but have not done as well in Sweden. He argues that Denmark and Sweden share anti-immigrant sentiments among the electorates and feelings of disenchantment toward the political institutions, but also that the two countries are different with regard to the socioeconomic dimension. While socioeconomic division has lost much of its importance in Danish politics, it is still highly salient in Swedish politics. Secondly, the issue of immigration has been much more salient in Denmark than in Sweden.
While immigration has dominated Danish politics during the last decade, in Sweden the socioeconomic dimension has been more important to voters. Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup. (2008) focus on the incentives for different parties in drawing attention to different issues, in their study of the immigration issue in Denmark and Sweden. Attention to this issue by the parties has been considerably stronger in Denmark than in Sweden. These authors explain this phenomenon by the different strategic situation of the mainstream right-wing parties in these two countries. Focusing on the immigrant issue can lead to a conflict with the center-right, especially socially liberal parties. In Sweden, such a conflict would undermine mainstream right-wing attempts at winning government power. In Denmark, the Liberals governed with the Social Democrats in the 1990s, which made it attractive for the main stream right-wing parties to focus on the issue in order to control the on the support of government with the support of neopopulist parties. The recent successes of the UK in the U.K. have followed a different path, however. Goodwin, Ford, and Cutts (2012) identified Euroscepticism as the main causal factor for voters supporting UKIP, along with concern over immigration levels and distrust of the political establishment. The typically UKIP voter was generally older than other voters, but Goodwin et al. found no correlation with social class, although UKIP voters did tend to feel more financially insecure. The skilled working class was found to be slightly overrepresented amongst UKIP voters, and there was a higher likelihood that a UKIP voter had grown up in a Conservative-supporting household compared to the average voter. Whitaker and Lynch (2011) concluded that the attitudes of UKIP supporters made them distinct from others voting for right-wing parties. The authors found that voter support for UKIP correlated with concerns about the value of immigration, hostility to immigrants and a lack of political trust in standard political institutions and processes, but the most powerful explanatory factor for support of UKIP was Euroscepticism.
Previous Research on UKIP
These authors also found in their subsequent 2013 research that the beliefs of UKIP voters were closely aligned to those of the UKIP candidates, particularly on issues surrounding European integration, which resulted in some Conservative voters switching to UKIP due to divisions within the Conservative Party over this issue. Similarly, Hayton (2010) suggests that the UKIP's second-place finish in the 2009 European Parliament elections was a sign of a more generalized shift toward the acceptance of the populist right in Britain. The following analysis examines UK public opinion following their electoral success in the 2014 European Parlimentary elections, in order to assess this 2014 outcome, given the rising discontent with the EU, the worsening economy, and that the UKIP was headed by a charismatic leader.
Methodology and Results
In order to identify the factors that contributed to the electoral success of UKIP, we conduct a canonical linear discriminant analysis to identify the most important variables that distinguish between the parties in the UK (See Appendix). The data is taken from the European Election Study (Schmitt et al., 2015) , which was collected via computer-assisted personal interviews (CAPI) in February and March of 2015, using a multi-stage stratified random sample of residents 18 years of age and over. There were 1421 completed interviews of UK voters, with 440 respondents who identified their party preference. As Table 1 shows, only three variables met the F score to be included in the model, suggesting that these three variables were the best discriminators of vote for a particular party. The number of dimensions is equal to the number of groups (Parties) minus 1. In addition, 57.8% of the variation in the model is explained by function 1, 18.3% is explained by function 2, and 7% is explained by function 3, with a cumulative 83.11% of all the variance explained by these three functions. Table 2 shows the standardized discriminant coefficients, which can be interpreted in a similar way as OLS regression coefficients, and are similar to weights, which index the importance of each predictor and the direction of the relationship. The loadings represent the correlation between the observed variables and the unobserved function/dimension, and can be interpreted like a "latent" variable or factor. So, we can interpret Function 1 to represent the Left-Right placement, or ideology. These findings suggests that the most powerful discriminating variable, for parties in the UK, is their left right placemen, as it has a loading of .-0.6550.
Function 2 is trust in the EU, with a loading of -0.3806. Function 3 is Unemployment (as the most important issue facing the country, according to the respondent), having a canonical loading of 0.6315. As we mentioned, the other functions are not statistically significant discriminants for the differences among party supporters. Turning to function 2, which was trust in the EU, the UKIP supporters were the least trusting of the EU, with a mean of -0.5842, followed by Labor with a mean of -.5254. Those two were the only parties to not trust the EU (negative standardized mean), with all other parties ranging from .004 to .8227 in their trust of the EU. The DUP was most trusting, with a standardized mean of .8227. The Conservative party was also trusting of the EU with a score of .6820.Function 3, was Unemployment (as a major issue facing country). The party most focused on Unemployment was Sinn Fein, with a mean of 1.17, and no other party was over 1. UKIP seemed in the middle on the issue, with a score of 0.0279. Conservatives and Labor were much less likely to list unemployment as a major issue with scores of -0.1874, and -0.0029 respectively. 
Update: the UKIP and the "Brexit" Referendum
The 'Brexit' referendum stunned governments and markets around the world, resulting in an almost instant shakeup of the UK government. Much of the 'Brexit' strategy was engineered by the UKIP and hinged on two messages; first, that the UK is a victim of exploitation by the technocrats of Brussels. The claim was that the EU takes 350 million pounds a week from UK residents that could be better spent on the NHS (Stone, 2016) . Second, immigrants from Syria and other parts of the world who 'lack the skills' to be productive members of society will be a burden on UK in the form of social services and increased crime (Johnston, 2016) . Our findings corroborate both the 'Brexit' political agenda and this 2016 vote, which demonstrates that UKIP occupied a unique position in the debate over this referendum. Moreover, our canonical discriminant analysis supports Goodwin's research by indicating that UKIP has the support of the right-leaning people, Eurosceptics, and perhaps most interesting, a relatively stable middle class.
In other words, while UKIP voters express great anxiety about unemployment-or the thought of losing their employment to an outsider-they are not disproportionately poor or unemployed. This suggests that the 'Brexit' vote is likely a combination of protest toward the EU and also a preemptive measure against the threat of further perceived social and economic decline. The political climate of the 'Brexit' moment seems to have been a combination of UKIP's populist appeals and the referendum process itself. Considering that UKIP has been consistently successful in EU-level politics, and that there was a great deal of uncertainty, even among more traditional conservatives, with regard to the relationship between the UK and EU, it is not surprising that a neopopulist party prevailed in both the 2014 European Elections and the Brexit referendum.
